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By John Pearson 
Researching and writing on extreme energy and, in particular, the tar sands being extracted in 
Alberta, Canada, presents facts (both questionable and accepted) which shock and appall. However, 
upon consideration of the phenomenon in the broader contexts in which it undeniably resides, those 
of energy security, geopolitics and development to name but a few, realism about such projects 
inevitably emerges. These realities necessitate, paraphrasing conventional wisdom, acceptance of 
that which we cannot change, courage to change that which we can, and the wisdom to know the 
difference. 
The abandonment of the two high profile examples of ‘extreme energy,’ the tar sands, and fracking 
in the USA and UK, is therefore unlikely. Our reliance on hydrocarbons is undeniable and as 
conventional reserves dwindle, the allure of unconventional sources grows. Denying our inextricable 
connection to them for the foreseeable future is, objectively, remiss. Progress towards alternatives 
continues unabated but expecting developments to come to fruition and ‘rescue’ us from our daily 
need for hydrocarbons and derivatives thereof would be naïve. As such, activists and environmental 
lawyers must accept that unconventional oil and gas extraction is inescapable in the short term. 
Essentially we are not able to break our ‘addiction to oil.’ 
The ultimate goal of activists should still be eliminating the use of hydrocarbons altogether; indeed 
such aspirational aims are needed to drive such activities. However, these are undeniably long term 
goals. Thus short term focus should be on objectives which can be achieved within that timeframe. 
Examples of issues arising from both the tar sands and fracking operations can be divided into two 
broad categories. These are the consumption of other resources to extract unconventional 
hydrocarbons and the contamination (and adverse effects) that it is suggested, extraction processes 
give rise to. This distinction illustrates a regulatory challenge as these categories necessitate distinct 
regulatory approaches. 
Concerns with regard to resource consumption in both fracking and the tar sands involve water. Vast 
amounts of water are utilised to extract raw materials from the earth and in the post-extraction 
refinement of tar sands. Estimates of the water consumed to produce oil from the tar sands range 
from two to five barrels for each barrel of synthetic crude produced. To most this is a perplexing and 
almost ridiculous ratio. Similarly to fracture rock formations releasing the natural gas sought in 
fracking, copious amounts of water and chemicals are used to expand existing faults. In the tar sands 
and fracking industries however, there are substantial incentives to increase water recycling. Such 
water consumption is capable of being reduced, and companies invest considerably into researching 
methods of doing so, through recycling or the use of alternatives. 
Extractors strive to regulate usage and tar sands extractors are forced to by the strict licensing of 
water withdrawals. Licensing in Alberta perpetually lowers consumption by reducing the volume 
allowed to be removed from natural water bodies if the quota allocated is not exhausted. Water 
extraction, transport and licensing costs themselves are prohibitive, and partly controlled by 
regulatory authorities, not market forces. Firms are incentivised to reduce potentially damaging 
water consumption by regulations which exploit existing economic motivations. In essence the 
system exploits market forces influencing all firms to promote good environmental practice, making 
the decision to act in a responsible manner ‘good business sense.’ 
The impacts of contamination are, by contrast, not as easily managed. A major concern regarding 
the tar sands is the effects of ‘tailings ponds,’ vast man made pools of by-products from extraction 
and refinement processes, in some instances toxic, which have caused considerable bird deaths, and 
are suggested as leaking in significant volumes into the surrounding ecosystem. The impacts of 
fracking courting controversy are the seismic consequences of the practice and the seepage of the 
fluid used to cause the fractures exposing the gas sought. In both cases the extent of the adverse 
effects of the practices is not known. Such an accusation could be levelled, and is conceded in 
relation to water consumption by tar sands industries. The impact of the water removed is not fully 
known, however the volume itself is strictly controlled and monitored. Commonalities are few, but 
the differences between the management of consumption and contamination are numerous. 
Consumption can be measured with incredible accuracy by regulators and extractors, but the degree 
of contamination by contrast is not easily ascertained. Thus imposing targets in relation to them with 
any certainty as to effectiveness is extremely difficult. In relation to fracking in particular, the fluid 
mixture utilised to expose and expand fractures varies by operator, and even between wells. Thus 
measuring the level of contamination from them is fraught with difficulty. Similarly the volume of 
seepage from tailings ponds would vary by pond, as would the concentration and composition 
thereof. Indeed the impacts of contamination vary wildly in response to innumerable factors. To 
take just the tailings ponds themselves, the size, location, rainfall, and construction of a single pond, 
as well as their contents, might alter said seepage and any impacts of the material upon the 
surrounding ecosystem. Similar issues arise owing to the variance in location of wells and fluid used 
by companies fracking for natural gas. Regulating the level of contamination in such instances is 
therefore liable to being plagued by inefficacy. 
The second distinction between consumption and contamination impacts is in the development of 
the adverse consequences which result. Consumption has immediate and quantifiable effects, such 
as withdrawal of a particular volume from a water course or body. The resultant secondary impacts 
of consumption are therefore potentially measurable themselves and can be attributed, largely 
incontrovertibly, to that action. In the case of contamination however attribution is not as easily 
achieved. As well as the variance in physical factors outlined above, the duration of development to 
quantifiable and assessable levels is also unpredictable and subject to innumerable influences. Often 
the impacts of such consumption, although long lasting, become apparent within a relatively short 
timeframe. For example, the effects of the extraction of large quantities of water from rivers and 
streams are often apparent, though not fully developed, within a seasonal cycle. The uptake of the 
various components of tailings by contrast can take much greater periods of time to take effect or 
become identifiable. Numerous reasons for this can be cited, for example, the migratory nature of 
large mammals, such as caribou, prevents harmful substances within a food chain accumulating as 
rapidly as they otherwise might. The relatively small number of humans eating native animals from 
the regions affected would also make impacts unlikely to be identified swiftly. Similarly the long 
term impacts of injecting fluid into the ground, or leaks from some well heads seeping into the water 
table, are unknown and not always attributable directly to extraction processes owing to a similar 
temporal disconnect. Indeed in many cases the original source of contamination will have abated or 
become less severe before the true extent of damage incurred is realised. 
The difficulty in identifying and attributing the impacts of contamination caused by such projects 
ensures that measures to regulate the industries involved are based upon precaution. The 
precautionary principle is a mainstay of environmental protection and enshrines a number of basic 
elements. That any damage reasonably perceived as potentially arising from an action should be 
mitigated to the greatest degree possible, that potential damage be balanced with benefit gained, 
and that the burden of proof in suggesting an action is not harmful or that an action should proceed 
in spite of the risks lies with the actor. The principle does not require all risks to be considered, or 
that a project cease due to any potential damage. Although the burden lies with the actor to prove 
that the action is harmless or relatively undamaging, if no significant damage can be shown to occur 
rarely are permits declined. Certainly this has been the case for the tar sands and fracking industries. 
The burden of proof of risk simply has not been breached. Herein lies a considerable challenge facing 
the regulation of extreme energy, and where the distinction between consumption and 
contamination impacts is most stark. The unknown nature of the impacts of contamination, in terms 
of form and extent severely inhibit regulation in effectively mitigating or eliminating damage. 
This can be illustrated clearly by contrasting them with consumption based impacts. The 
consumption of any resource to provide a product, such as natural gas and synthetic crude oil, bears 
inherent costs. These may take the form of regulatory charges, equipment, transportation, or simply 
the resource’s purchase price. As such there are constant pressures to reduce costs and remain 
competitive. This results in reduced consumption and more efficient practices and, coupled with a 
desire to at least appear ‘green’ or environmentally minded in operations, is a relatively effective 
and self –perpetuating method of ensuring efforts to reduce consumption and its impacts. 
Contamination impacts however, once mitigated to a degree necessitated by the nature of a by-
product, are of negligible cost to the extractor unless they can be attributed incontrovertibly to 
them. Only then may they potentially give rise to a basis for legal action against either the licensing 
authority or extractor. The difficulties of attribution and the temporal disconnect between 
extraction and impact common in many such industries, reduce the likelihood of success of actions. 
From an ecological perspective they are also the greatest concern. The impact of consumption by 
volume would be reduced from the outset, the drive for profits promoting the reduction in costs by 
industry. Whilst this does not account for rises in output or demand, as reductions might be 
outweighed by increased extraction, meaning net consumption would not fall, progress would 
undoubtedly be made at a greater rate than were these factors not present. Contamination impacts 
beyond storage or disposal of by-products cost the industry relatively little unless adverse effects are 
proven and attributed. Research into improving the reclamation of the tailings ponds is ongoing, and 
is subject to cumulative efforts by extractors; however the licensing and leasing processes do not 
stipulate requirements in this regard beyond a broad, non-committal suggestion to return the land 
to an equivalent capacity. Thus the financial incentive to reduce contamination is far less, and this is 
one of the most potent methods to ensure compliance or action on the part of private commercial 
actors. The consistent reductions in water consumption by the tar sands industry reflect this reality. 
The challenge is in accepting that the use of increasingly extreme methods to obtain oil and gas 
resources is inevitable in some degree. The fracking and tar sands industries will not cease their 
operations by choice or regulation in the foreseeable future. After this realisation however, those 
concerned with the impacts of such industries must choose their battles carefully. The existence of 
regulations concerning reducing consumption, as well as the financial incentives has proved more 
effective than activism thus far. This is not to say activism is ineffective or without its place, more 
that it should be directed to areas where there is less inherent incentive for industry to act in the 
manner sought. The free market has been one of the most effective means of promoting actions on 
the part of companies, and extreme energy projects are no exception. Whether regulation could 
emulate or mimic economic incentives is questionable, but activists, regulators and lawyers alike 
should focus upon contamination. The unknown nature of both cause and effect of impacts which 
stem from contamination make them a far more pressing concern than those which are subject 
already to concerted efforts to be reduced, and the extent of which can be assessed. As such in 
efforts to restrict the inevitable exploitation of sources of extreme energy, the focus should be on 
that for which precaution cannot be exercised, and there is negligible existing incentive to reduce. 
We cannot change the continuation of such projects in the short term and their ever-decreasing 
consumption of resources, but we should have the courage to change that which we can, 
contamination, and have the wisdom to know the difference. 
 
